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The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality  
 
Abstract: This study investigates the effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial 
reporting quality. I find that higher CEO inside debt holdings are associated with lower 
abnormal accruals, higher accruals quality, a lower likelihood of an earnings misstatement, 
and a lower incidence of earnings benchmark beating, suggesting that CEO inside debt 
promotes high financial reporting quality. Additional analyses reveal that (i) CEO inside debt 
holdings reduce firm-specific stock price crash risk, and that (ii) auditors are less likely to 
report a material internal control weakness for firms that have large CEO inside debt. 
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates whether CEO inside debt holdings affect financial reporting 
quality. A vast literature on executive compensation focuses predominantly on bonus and 
equity-based compensation paid in the form of stocks, stock options, and other instruments 
whose value is tied to future equity returns. Far less research attention has been paid to the 
widespread practice of paying top executives with debt in the form of pension and deferred 
compensation though these constitute a significant portion of the executive compensation 
package. The payment structure of pension and deferred compensation resembles debt 
contracts, representing a fixed obligation for a firm to make future payments to corporate 
insiders and thus making executives long-term bondholders of that firm. Therefore the 
incentive plan is also termed “inside debt.” The literature provides evidence that executive 
compensation components such as bonus, stock, and stock options do impact accounting 
choices. However, the effect of debt compensation incentives on financial reporting remains 
largely unexplored due to the limited reporting requirement for firms to disclose inside debt. 
As of December 15, 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires all firms 
to disclose in their proxy statements the annual accruals of pension benefits and the present 
value of accrued pension benefits for each of a firm’s top five executives. Using the CEO 
pension and deferred compensation data available due to this regulatory change, this study 
empirically explores whether and how CEO debt compensation incentive is related to 
financial reporting quality.  
Theories offer two competing hypotheses. On the one hand, inside debt could motivate 
managers to commit to high-quality financial reporting. Unlike equity holdings, inside debt 
holdings induce CEOs to refrain from risk-seeking and to take a longer view of a firm’s 
future prospects, aligning CEO incentives with debtholder incentives. Prior studies (Jensen 
2 
 
and Meckling 1976; Edmans and Liu 2011) document that the value of inside debt depends 
on both the default risk and the liquidation value of a firm in the event of bankruptcy or 
reorganization. Hence inside debt-holders tend to avoid making decisions that increase the 
overall risk of a firm (Cassell et al. 2012). They are especially averse to downside risk that 
arises in a firm in the long run. In this vein, CEOs who have larger inside debt should care 
more about the riskiness and costs of financial misreporting that arise in the long term. 
Financial misreporting induces a high risk of subsequent detection and hence reputational 
loss along with litigation and regulatory actions to a firm (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar 2008). 
The reputational harm would make it difficult for a firm to finance or contract for its 
investments and operations in the future, and as a result, potential default risk of the firm 
could increase. Furthermore, financial misreporting may induce overinvestment in risky 
projects that increases corporate default risk (e.g., McNichols and Stubben 2008; Kedia and 
Philippon 2009; Kumar and Langberg 2009). Therefore firms with high CEO inside debt 
holdings should be less likely to commit financial misreporting.  
Inside debt might exacerbate agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. 
Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) document that CEO debt compensation reduces pay- 
performance sensitivity and manifests itself in agency conflicts between shareholders and 
managers. If so, shareholders will demand higher financial reporting quality accordingly, 
whereby they can better monitor managers to curb any rent extraction. Therefore the role of 
inside debt in shareholder-manager conflict also lends support to the notion that inside debt 
increases financial reporting quality.  
    However, given that CEO inside debt reduces the equity-debt conflict, debtholders may 
demand less accounting conservatism, which in turn may result in an increased likelihood of 
financial misreporting. This plausible competing story may not hold in that the mitigating 
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effect of CEO inside debt on equity-debt conflict does not necessarily reduce debtholders’ 
demand for conservative accounting. CEO inside debt and accounting conservatism may also 
work as complements, rather than substitutes, in curbing conflicts between shareholders and 
debtholders. I leave the association between CEO inside debt holdings and financial reporting 
quality as an open question and empirically test it in this study.  
I follow Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) theoretical framework and Wei and Yermack’s 
(2011) approach to construct CEO relative leverage measure that captures CEO debt 
compensation incentives. CEO relative leverage is measured as the CEO’s personal debt-to- 
equity ratio divided by corporate debt-to-equity ratio. When CEO relative leverage is above 1, 
the CEO will have an incentive alignment with debtholders and vice versa (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Wei and Yermack 2011; Edmans and Liu 2011). Based on the sample that 
contains CEO inside debt information from 2006 to 2011, I find that firms with higher CEO 
relative leverage exhibit a lower level of abnormal accruals, higher accruals quality, a lower 
likelihood of an earnings misstatement, and a lower incidence of meeting or beating analyst 
earnings forecasts. This is consistent with the notion that CEO inside debt promotes high 
financial reporting quality. 
CEO compensation contracts and financial reporting quality could be endogenous. In 
particular, high-quality financial reporting increases investment efficiency (e.g., Easley and 
O’Hara 2004; Lambert et al. 2007; Biddle et al. 2009) and reduces the downside risk of a 
firm in the long run, which could in turn incentivize managers to hold more inside debt. To 
address this possibility, I adopt a two-stage regression approach with state individual tax rate 
as an instrument for CEO relative leverage. Since a higher individual tax rate would induce a 
CEO to defer income and the associated tax burden to a later period, CEO relative leverage is 
expected to be positively related to state individual tax rate. However, the individual tax rate 
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is unlikely to affect financial reporting quality, making it a valid instrument for testing the 
impact of CEO relative leverage on financial reporting quality. My results are robust to the 
instrumental variable estimation.  
Given the positive link between CEO inside debt holdings and financial reporting 
quality, I conduct two additional analyses. Firstly, I test how CEO inside debt affects 
firm-specific stock price crash risk. The stock price crash is documented by prior literature to 
be the outcome of managers’ hoarding bad news inside a firm (e.g., Jin and Myers 2006; 
Bleck and Liu 2007; Hutton et al. 2009). In essence, there exists an upper limit where it 
becomes too costly or difficult for managers to further withhold the bad news (Kothari et al. 
2009), but managers usually cannot anticipate when the upper limit point will arrive. Once 
the tipping point is reached, all of the stockpiled bad news will come out all at once, resulting 
in a sudden and drastic decline in stock price, that is, a stock price crash (Hutton et al. 2009; 
Jin and Myers 2006). If high CEO inside debt contributes to high financial reporting quality, 
the information environment of a firm becomes more transparent, and thus there would be 
less latitude for bad news hoarding. As a result, the crash risk would be lower for firms that 
have high CEO inside debt holdings. Following Chen et al. (2001) and Hutton et al. (2009), I 
measure the stock price crash risk as the likelihood of negative, extreme firm-specific weekly 
returns over a fiscal year. The empirical results show that large CEO inside debt decreases 
firm-specific stock price crash risk, consistent with my prediction.  
Secondly, I examine how CEO inside debt affects the likelihood that auditors attest to a 
material internal control weakness for a firm. If a firm with high CEO inside debt holdings is 
inclined to promote high quality of financial reporting, the firm should tend to improve its 
internal control over financial reporting. As a result, auditors would be more likely to 
perceive the firm as having low control risk and would be less likely to report a material 
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internal control weakness for the firm. Consistent with this notion, I find a significantly 
negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and the incidence of an 
auditor-attested material internal control weakness. Also, I find that large CEO inside debt is 
associated with a low likelihood of a material internal control weakness that is self-identified 
and disclosed by managers.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, numerous theoretical and 
empirical studies analyze the relationship between managerial compensation contracts and 
accounting choices in terms of bonus incentive (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Healy 
1985; Gaver et al. 1995; Holthausen et al. 1995; Guidry et al. 1999; Murphy 2000) and equity 
incentive (e.g. Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Bartov and Mohanram 2004; Cheng and Warfield 
2005; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Efendi et al. 2007; Jiang et al. 2009; Armstrong et al. 
2013). Most of these studies find that bonus and equity compensation components induce 
managers to engage in accounting discretion. Still, the role of inside debt in financial 
reporting has received little attention, though debt-based compensation is distinct from other 
executive pay components. This study fills in this void by providing the first evidence on the 
impact of inside debt compensation on financial reporting quality. By showing that CEO 
inside debt curbs financial misreporting, this study has important implications for boards of 
directors, which contemplate compensation contracts for executives. 
Second, prior literature (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Bharath et al. 2008; Gul and 
Goodwin 2010; Chava et al. 2010) highlights the role of outside debt as a control mechanism 
for a firm to commit to high financial transparency. This study extends this literature by 
showing that, similar to outside debt, inside debt also promotes high quality financial reports. 
The finding complements the recent finance literature over the proposition that inside debt 
reduces agency cost of debt and contributes to efficient executive compensation contracting 
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(e.g., Bushman and Smith 2001; Sundaram and Yermack 2007; Wei and Yermack 2011; 
Edmans and Liu 2011).  
In addition, this study provides the first evidence on the effect of CEO inside debt on 
firm-specific stock price crash risk, which adds to the recent stream of research on the 
economic consequences of CEO inside debt (e.g., Wei and Yermack 2011). Unlike these 
recent studies, which generally focus on the “mean-pricing” impact of CEO inside debt in 
terms of cost of capital and firm valuation, I focus on the stock price crashes, which provides 
additional insights into the market consequences of CEO inside debt. Also, this study 
provides new insight into how debt compensation incentives affect internal control quality, 
revealing that firms with large CEO inside debt tend to improve their internal control over 
financial reporting. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypothesis. 
Section 3 describes the data collection procedure and the variable measures. Section 4 
presents the research methodologies. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 conducts the 
additional tests, and section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
2.1. Related literature on the role of inside debt in mitigating agency conflict of debt  
     In most U.S. companies, the CEO inside debt obligation is unsecured and unfunded, 
exposing executives to the same default risk and insolvency treatment as outside creditors 
because inside debt holders have equal priority with other creditors over claiming liquidated 
assets in the case of bankruptcy. Hence inside debt serves as a curb on executives’ risk-taking 
incentives and reduces agency cost of debt (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Sundaram and 
Yermack 2007; Wei and Yermack 2011; Edmans and Liu 2011).  
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Recent empirical and theoretical studies confirm the role of inside debt in mitigating the 
agency conflicts of debt. For instance, Edmans and Liu (2011) offer a theoretical framework 
to justify the use of inside debt as efficient compensation, showing that the inside debt not 
only reduces risk-shifting overinvestments but also induces executives to increase the 
liquidation value of a firm. Wei and Yermack (2011) and Bolton et al. (2010) show that high 
CEO inside debt holdings lead to an increase in bond price, which is attributed to the 
reduction of risk-shifting investment that transfers wealth from debtholders to shareholders. 
Tung and Wang (2010) focus on banking industry and find that high CEO relative leverage 
corresponds to lower stock return volatility and fewer high-risk investments such as 
mortgage-backed securities. Belkhir and Boubaker (2013) find that CEOs with larger inside 
debt hedge more their banks’ interest rate risk, suggesting that inside debt mitigates bank 
executives’ risk-taking incentives. Cassell et al. (2012) show that CEO inside debt holdings 
improve the incentive alignment between CEOs and debtholders by encouraging managers to 
implement less risky investments and financial policies. Furthermore, Anantharaman et al. 
(2012), Chen et al. (2011), and Chava et al. (2010) find fewer bond covenant restrictions and 
a lower cost of debt financing for firms that have larger CEO inside debt. Their empirical 
evidence also lends support to the notion that CEO debt compensation aligns the interests of 
managers with those of debtholders and reduces agency cost of debt.  
 
2.2. The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality  
There might be tension over the theoretical link between CEO inside debt and financial 
reporting quality. On the one hand, high CEO inside debt holdings may induce high financial 
reporting quality. Prior research (e.g., Cheng and Warfield 2005) documents that the value of 
CEO equity holdings is tied to short-term stock price (i.e., the value of shares the CEOs are 
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about to sell), which motivates CEOs to focus on short-term prospects of a firm’s 
performance. Also, the value of CEO equity holdings (particularly stock options) is sensitive 
to the volatility of stock price (e.g., Coles et al. 2006; Low 2009), which motivates CEOs to 
increase the riskiness of firm operations to increase their equity wealth. Consistent with this 
notion, a recent study by Armstrong et al. (2013) finds that the sensitivity of the managers’ 
wealth to changes in risks (i.e., equity vega) is positively associated with financial 
misreporting that increases firm risk. In contrast, the value of inside debt is sensitive to the 
default probability and the liquidation value of a firm in the event of bankruptcy (Edmans and 
Liu 2011). Hence, unlike equity-based compensation, debt-based compensation induces 
CEOs to refrain from risk-taking and to take a longer term view of firm prospects, thereby 
leading to an incentive alignment between CEOs and debtholders. As documented in Cassell 
et al. (2012), to preserve firm value and reduce likelihood of default, CEOs who have larger 
inside debt tend to be more conservative in making corporate decisions, avoiding increases in 
the riskiness of firm operations.  
Similarly, large inside debt-holders are sensitive to the riskiness and costs of financial 
misreporting. Financial misreporting exposes a firm to high risks of detection and 
reputational loss along with litigation and regulatory actions (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar 
2008). Karpoff et al. (2008) find that substantial reputational penalties, which are defined as 
the expected loss in the present value of future cash flows due to lower sales and higher 
contracting and financing costs, are imposed on firms for financial misrepresentations. The 
reputational harm as regards the low financial reporting quality would attract enhanced 
scrutiny and queries from all external stakeholders and make it difficult for a firm to finance 
or contract for investment and operation activities in the future. As a consequence, firm value 
would decrease and default risk would increase. As CEOs with large inside debt are 
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concerned about the default risk and the recovery value in default, they should exhibit a 
strong commitment to maintaining high financial reporting quality. 
Another negative consequence of financial misreporting, as theoretically and empirically 
evidenced in prior studies (e.g., Sadka 2006; McNichols and Stubben 2008; Kedia and 
Philippon 2009; Kumar and Langberg 2009), is that it induces overinvestment that increases a 
firm’s default risk. In particular, managers, who unintentionally inflate reported financial 
performance, believe the misreported growth trend and will overinvest in the financial and 
product markets. Alternatively, managers, who intentionally boost reported accounting 
numbers, will overinvest in a high-risk approach to maintain consistency between 
misreported performance and investments (Sadka 2006; McNichols and Stubben 2008; Kedia 
and Philippon 2009). In a similar vein, managers deflating reported earnings may tend to 
underinvest. Conversely, high quality financial reporting improves capital investment 
efficiency by reducing adverse selection, liquidity risk, and information risk (e.g., Bushman 
and Smith 2001; Easley and O’Hara 2004; Lambert et al. 2007; Biddle et al. 2009), thereby 
guarding against financial distress for a firm in the long run. In sum, as large inside debt 
holders are averse to a firm’s downside risk in the long run, they should be more sensitive to 
the negative consequences of financial misreporting that arise in the long run. 
Inside debt reduces agency conflict of debt but may also exacerbate agency conflict 
between managers and shareholders. As documented by Bebchuk and Jackson (2005), CEO 
debt compensation reduces pay-performance sensitivity and aggravates agency cost of equity. 
If so, shareholders will increase their demand for high financial reporting quality, whereby 
they can more effectively monitor managers to prevent any opportunism and rent extraction. 
Furthermore, managerial rent extraction reduces the expected value of a firm’s future cash 
flows and increases default risk, which in turn hurts debtholders. Hence, in this case, not only 
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shareholders but also debtholders will demand high financial reporting quality. The demand 
for financial reporting quality appears even greater for debtholders than for shareholders, as 
evidenced by Ball et al. (2008) and Jayaraman and Shivakumar (2013). On the whole, the 
role of inside debt in shareholder-manager conflict also lends support to the notion that inside 
debt increases financial reporting quality.  
On the other hand, there is a plausible competing story. In particular, CEO inside debt 
mitigates agency conflict of debt and, as a result, may reduce outside debtholders’ demand 
for accounting conservatism. Less conservative accounting may in turn induce more 
aggressive financial reporting. In this vein, we would expect a negative association between 
CEO inside debt and financial reporting quality.  
Nevertheless, the competing story needs to be interpreted with caution. The attenuating 
effect of CEO inside debt on the debt-equity conflict does not necessarily reduce outside 
debtholders’ demand for accounting conservatism. Creditors care about whether a firm can 
repay interest and principle and hence care about the firm’s future cash flows. In addition to 
equity-debt conflict per se, the conflict between managers and other external stakeholders 
could also have a negative real effect on a firm’s future stream of cash flows, which thereby 
has an indirect impact on debtholders’ interests. If, say, managers divert resources from 
shareholders, or their relationships with their customers or suppliers deteriorate, the expected 
value of a firm’s future cash flows would decrease, which impairs the firm’s ability to repay 
interest and principle in the future. 
  Prior research documents that conservative accounting facilitates efficient contracting 
and mitigates the conflicts between managers and related parties such as shareholders (e.g., 
Lara et al. 2009), employees (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2013), suppliers, and customers (e.g., Hui 
et al. 2012), etc. If so, even though CEO inside debt mitigates equity-debt conflict, creditors 
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could still have great demand for accounting conservatism on account of the other possible 
conflicts of interests, i.e., those between managers and other stakeholders, which may cause a 
decrease in a firm’s future cash flows. In this scenario, CEO inside debt by no means could 
substitute accounting conservatism in safeguarding outside debtholders’ interests. Instead, 
accounting conservatism and CEO inside debt work together to align the interests of 
shareholders and debtholders. Accordingly, large CEO inside debt should not induce less 
accounting conservatism. Instead, if inside debt does prompt CEOs to reduce default risk 
(Wei and Yermack 2011; Edmans and Liu 2011), the CEOs may instead adopt relatively 
more conservative accounting to prevent risky and value-destroying investments.1  
In spite of the dubious competing story, this study still acknowledges an empirical issue 
about whether high CEO inside debt leads to high financial reporting quality. Accordingly, I 
lay out my hypothesis in a null form as follows.  
H1: CEO inside debt holdings are related to financial reporting quality. 
 
3. Data and Variable measures 
3.1. Sample and data source 
The empirical analyses are based on the data gathered primarily from five sources: 
ExecuComp, Compustat, CRSP, Audit Analytic, and RiskMetric. I start the sample 
construction process with the ExecuComp database, which provides the data on the present 
value of accumulated pension benefits and the aggregate balance of non-qualified deferred 
compensation for each top executive at the S&P 1500 companies. Starting from December 15, 
2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required public firms to disclose 
                                                 
1 See Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Francis and Martin (2010), Jayaraman and Shivakumar (2013), 
Roychowdhury (2010), and Bushman et al. (2011), for instance, for the details on how accounting 
conservatism could curb risky and value-destroying investment activities of a firm.  
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detailed information about the computation and value of executive pension benefits and 
deferred compensation. Thus my sample period ranges from 2006 to 2011.  
The initial sample extracted from ExecuComp consists of firm-year observations for the 
S&P 1500 firms that contain CEO inside debt information over the sample period. I further 
require that firms have necessary data from CRSP, Compustat, Audit Analytic, and 
RiskMetric to construct the variables of interest in the empirical analyses. The final sample 
ends up with 5596, 4238, 7547, and 5685 firm-year observations (corresponding with 1285, 
1137, 1680, and 1572 unique firms) for testing the impact of CEO inside debt holdings on 
abnormal accruals, accruals quality, earnings misstatement, and earnings benchmark beating 
(the proxies for financial reporting quality to be discussed in section 3.3), respectively.2  
 
3.2. CEO inside debt measure 
Prior studies (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Sundaram and Yermack 2007; Edmans 
and Liu 2011) document that inside debt compensation aligns CEO incentives with 
debtholder incentives. The incentive alignment varies with the relative weight of debt- versus 
equity-based compensation in the executive pay structure. The higher the CEO’s personal 
leverage is relative to the firm leverage (i.e., CEO relative leverage), the higher is the 
likelihood that CEO incentives are aligned with those of debtholders. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Sundaram and Yermack (2007), and Edmans and Liu (2011) theorize that, when 
CEOs’ personal debt-to-equity ratio exceeds corporate debt-to-equity ratio (i.e., the relative 
                                                 
2 The difference in the number of firm-year observations for the final sample is due to the data 
requirements in constructing different financial reporting quality proxies for the regression analyses. For 
instance, to construct an abnormal accruals variable using the modified Jones model, observations in a 
two-digit SIC-code industry that has less than 20 firms for a year are excluded. In constructing an earnings 
benchmark beating variable, observations with no analyst earnings forecasts for a fiscal year are eliminated. 
In addition, the number of unique firms in my sample could exceed 1500 because the classification on S&P 
1500 firms changes over years in the sample period. 
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leverage ratio exceeds 1), the CEOs will have an incentive alignment with debtholders and 
vice versa.  
Accordingly, following Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Wei and Yermack (2011), I 
construct a dummy variable, InsiDebt, which takes value of 1 if CEO relative leverage 
exceeds 1 and 0 otherwise. This dummy not only captures any nonlinearity in the relationship 
between CEO relative leverage and financial reporting quality but also addresses a potential 
outlier problem. One may argue that the level of CEO equity holdings per se from the 
denominator could also induce the positive association between CEO relative leverage ratio 
and financial reporting quality. In this case, the empirical results could be driven by CEO 
equity rather than CEO debt. This concern, however, is minimal because a recent study by 
Armstrong et al. (2013) shows that it is equity vega, rather than equity delta and equity 
ownership, that induces CEO incentives to misreport. Still, to ensure that the association 
between CEO relative leverage and financial reporting quality does not result from merely 
the flip side of the positive relation between equity incentive and financial misreporting, I 
control for CEO equity ownership and equity vega in the multivariate analyses. My use of the 
indicator variable, which is based on whether the CEO relative leverage exceeds the key 
cut-off point of 1, also mitigates the potential flip-side effect of CEO equity holdings.   
Following prior research, I measure CEO relative leverage as the ratio of CEO personal 
leverage to firm leverage. The CEO personal leverage is defined as the value of inside debt 
holdings divided by the value of CEO equity holdings, where the former equals the sum of 
the actuarial present value of accumulated benefits under defined-benefit pension plans and 
the total balance in the deferred compensation plans by the fiscal year-end, and the latter 
equals the value of CEO stock and stock option holdings (details on the calculation are 
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provided in appendix II).3 The firm leverage is calculated as the sum of long-term debt and 
debt in current liabilities divided by market value of stockholder equity at the fiscal year end.4 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of InsiDebt. The mean value is 21.61%. Thus the 
majority of the sample observations have CEO relative leverage ratio below 1, which is 
consistent with Wei and Yermack (2011). 
In addition, I adopt another inside debt measure developed by Wei and Yermack (2011), 
that is, the CEO relative incentive ratio. This ratio estimates the marginal increase in CEO 
inside debt over the marginal increase in CEO inside equity, given a one-dollar increase in 
firm value, scaled by the marginal increase in firm debt over the marginal increase in firm 
equity, given the same one-dollar increase in firm value. Likewise, if the CEO relative 
incentive ratio exceeds 1, CEO incentives are aligned with debtholder incentives and vice 
versa (Wei and Yermack 2011). Accordingly, I construct an indicator variable based on 
whether the relative incentive ratio exceeds 1.5 Its mean value (not tabulated) amounts to 
0.2241. The use of this alternative measure of CEO compensation incentive does not change 
the inferences drawn in all the empirical analyses.  
 
3.3. Proxy for financial reporting quality 
                                                 
3 It is difficult to determine the deferred compensation investment choices of individual CEOs in a 
systematic manner because the disclosure requirements are ambiguous (Wei and Yermack 2011). So 
following Cassell et al. (2012), I assume that CEOs do not invest their deferred compensation in the 
common stocks. In untabulated sensitivity tests, I alternatively assume that all CEOs are required to invest 
100% of their deferred compensation in common stocks. Accordingly, I adjust the relative leverage ratio 
by shifting the aggregate amount of deferred compensation from CEO debt holdings to CEO equity 
holdings. Use of this alternate variable specification does not change any inference in the paper.  
4 I obtain qualitatively the same results if I use firm leverage which is defined as the sum of long-term 
debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the sum of market value of stockholders’ equity and fair 
market value of outstanding stock options. 
5 I do not describe the detailed procedure of estimating the CEO relative incentive ratio, as I follow 
exactly the same procedure as that of Wei and Yermack (2011).  
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This study considers four proxies for financial reporting quality: (i) abnormal accruals, 
(ii) accruals quality, (iii) earnings misstatement, and (iv) earnings target beating, which are 
commonly used in a large body of accounting literature (Dechow et al. 2010). 
The first proxy is the absolute value of abnormal accruals (DA), estimated using the 
cross-sectional modified Jones model with at least 20 firms for each year and two-digit 
SIC-code industry (Dechow et al. 1995). The modified Jones model assumes that accruals are 
determined by operational fundamentals such as revenues and fixed assets, and any 
deviations from such fundamentals are attributed to managerial accounting manipulation. 
High (low) value of DA corresponds to low (high) financial reporting quality. DA captures 
both income increasing and income decreasing opportunistic discretion. Nevertheless, one 
may argue that overstatement of earnings is far more detrimental to a firm than 
understatement of earnings and thus outsiders are generally concerned about the former. So I 
also adopt signed abnormal accruals as a complementary measure of the quality of a firm’s 
financial report.  
I further consider two alternative measures of abnormal accruals estimated by another 
two approaches. First, I follow Kothari et al. (2005) to construct performance-matched 
abnormal accruals since they argue that a performance-matched accruals measure mitigates 
type I errors. Second, Ball and Shivakumar (2006) argue that the conventional linear accruals 
models (e.g., the modified Jones model), which ignore the roles of accruals in timely loss 
recognition, misspecify the accounting accruals process and misestimate the abnormal and 
normal components of accruals. They find that piecewise-linear regression, which 
incorporates the asymmetric gain and loss recognition role of accruals, substantially increases 
the explanatory power of accruals model. Following the abnormal accruals model developed 
by Ball and Shivakumar (2006), I use both book-based and market-return-based gain and loss 
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proxies to construct the piecewise-linear regression estimates for my second alternative 
measure of abnormal accruals. My results are insensitive to both of the alternative 
specifications of abnormal accruals.  
The second proxy for financial reporting quality is accruals quality, which represents 
the degree to which accruals map into current, past, and future cash flows (Dechow and 
Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2005). The better the mapping, the higher a firm’s financial 
reporting quality. Francis et al. (2005) suggest that the cross-sectional Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model used to attain the accruals quality measure can be improved by controlling for 
growth in revenues and the level of property, plant, and equipment. I follow the Francis et 
al.’s (2005) approach to derive the accruals quality measure (which is termed DD). DD 
captures the extent to which accruals do not map into cash flows and is an inverse measure of 
financial reporting quality. 
    The third proxy pertains to earnings misstatements as numerous studies (e.g., Desai et al. 
2006; Ecker et al. 2006) identify an earnings misstatement as a potent indicator for low 
financial reporting quality.6 I set a dummy variable, Res, indicating whether a firm has had 
an earnings misstatement for a fiscal year. Firms with high financial reporting quality would 
have a low likelihood of an earnings misstatement.  
The last proxy for financial reporting quality is earnings target beating. A stream of prior 
research (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Moehrle 2002; McVay et al. 2006; Ayers et al. 2006) 
provides evidence that earnings are likely managed when firms just meet or beat analyst 
earnings forecasts. Furthermore, based on a large body of literature on the observed 
determinants and consequences of earnings target beating, Dechow et al. (2010) argue that, 
                                                 
6 Another proxy for financial reporting quality is the indicator for whether the SEC publishes an 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) that identifies accounting fraud or 
misrepresentation that occurs for a firm over a fiscal year. Unfortunately, there are less than 50 AAER 
firm-year observations in my sample, which prevents me from drawing valid statistical inferences from the 
multivariate results. Thus I do not use AAERs as the proxy for financial reporting quality.  
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compared to other target beating such as small profits and small loss avoidance, meeting or 
beating analyst earnings forecasts better indicates earnings management and is yet another 
important dimension of financial reporting quality.7 Therefore I focus on the likelihood of 
meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts to measure financial reporting quality. The 
summary statistics of the financial reporting quality measures are provided in Table 1 and 
comparable to those reported in prior literature (e.g., Ayers et al. 2011; Doyle et al. 2007; 
Armstrong et al. 2013, among others). 
 
4. Research Design 
4.1. The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality 
    To test the impact of CEO inside debt holdings on abnormal accruals and on accruals 
quality, I conduct the following pooled OLS regression model. 
     0 1 2( , )DA or DA DD InsiDebt Controls                               (1) 
DA is the absolute value of abnormal accruals, estimated using the modified Jones 
model with at least 20 firms for each year and two-digit SIC-code industry (e.g., Dechow et 
al. 1995). DA is the signed value of the abnormal accruals. DD is the standard deviation of 
residuals from the modified Dechow and Dichev model proposed by Francis et al. (2005). 
Larger DD indicates poorer accruals quality. InsiDebt is an indicator variable for CEO 
relative leverage, as defined previously. The control variables consist of two main categories. 
The first category comprises corporate governance characteristics, which include CEO equity 
ownership (CEOowner), institutional ownership (Insti), the sum of independent director 
ownership (IndpShare), the proportion of independent directors (Indp), and the presence of 
Big-4 auditors (Big4) (e.g., Ayers et al. 2011). I further include the sensitivity of managers’ 
wealth to changes in equity risk (Vega) because equity vega may dominate equity delta in 
                                                 
7 See Dechow et al. (2010) for detailed literature review on earnings target beating.  
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creating managerial incentives to misreport financial information (Armstrong et al. 2013). 
The second category comprises financial and market-based variables that may affect 
managers’ incentives to manage earnings. These variables include return on assets (ROA), a 
loss dummy (Loss), long-term debt-to-assets (Debt), market-to-book ratio (Mb), firm size 
(Size), sales growth (Salesgrowth), cash flow volatility (StdCash), and sales volatility 
(StdSales) (e.g., Klein 2002; Hribar and Nichols 2007; Zhao and Chen 2008; Ayers et al. 
2011). All the control variables are defined in appendix I. If CEO inside debt induces high 
quality of financial reports, the coefficient on InsiDebt should be significantly negative.  
     Next, to test the impact of CEO inside debt holdings on the incidence of an earnings 
misstatement and on the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts, I use the 
following pooled probit regression model. 
      
0 1 2Re ( )s or AnaSur InsiDebt Controls                              (2) 
 Res takes value of 1 if a firm misstates its financial report for a fiscal year and 0 
otherwise. AnaSur equals 1 when a firm meets or beats by 1 percent the median consensus 
analyst earnings forecast as reported in I/B/E/S database over a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. A 
higher incidence of an earnings misstatement or a higher likelihood of meeting or beating 
analyst earnings forecasts is associated with lower financial reporting quality. So if the 
positive link between CEO inside debt and financial reporting quality holds for H1, 1 should 
take on a negative sign. The control variables in model (2) are the same as those included in 
model (1) and are defined in appendix I. 
Financial reporting quality and CEO inside debt may be endogenously determined by 
certain unobservable CEO characteristics (say, high-quality financial reports might be 
motivated by CEOs’ preferences of holding large inside debt), which biases the coefficient 
estimates in model (1) and (2). Furthermore, as executive pension and deferred compensation 
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plans are negotiable and usually based on not only years of service but also pre-retirement 
salaries, CEOs could negotiate their compensation contracts to obtain a higher or lower level 
of debt compensation (Lee and Tang 2011). High financial reporting quality increases 
investment efficiency and decreases downside risk of a firm in the long run, which could 
incentivize managers to hold more inside debt of the firm. Thus a reverse causality problem 
arises in the way that high financial reporting quality leads to high inside debt holdings. To 
alleviate the endogeneity, I employ a two-stage instrumental variable regression approach.  
Defined pension benefits and deferred compensation package benefit CEOs by deferring 
their personal income and associated tax to a later period. These benefits increase with the 
marginal tax rate faced by the CEOs (Scholes et al. 2002). So CEOs subject to higher 
marginal tax rates on their personal income have a stronger incentive to defer compensation, 
resulting in higher inside debt holdings. In this regard, I use the individual tax rate of the state 
in which a firm is headquartered as the instrumental variable for CEO inside debt. The state 
individual tax rate satisfies the condition of being a valid instrument in that it affects CEO 
inside debt but is unlikely to influence financial reporting.  
     The following probit regression model is specified as the first-step estimate for the 
two-stage instrumental regression analysis.  
     0 1 2 3InsiDebt StateWage StateInterest Controls                         (3) 
The dependent variable, InsiDebt, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if CEO relative 
leverage ratio exceeds 1 and 0 otherwise, where the CEO relative leverage ratio is as defined 
previously. The instrumental variables include the maximum tax rate for wages (StateWage) 
and the maximum mortgage subsidy rate (StateInterest) faced by a CEO in the state of the 
firm’s headquarters. StateWage is expected to be positively related to InsiDebt. StateInterest 
is expected to be negatively associated with InsiDebt since the mortgage subsidy reduces the 
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CEOs’ overall tax burden. The standard two-stage instrumental variable approach requires 
control variables in the first-stage regression to be the same as those specified in the 
second-stage regression. Hence the control variables in model (3) are the same as those 
included in model (1) and (2). The bootstrapping procedure is employed for the second-stage 
regression to obtain consistent estimators (Imbens and Wooldridge 2007). As with Bae et al. 
(2011) and Deng et al. (2013), I use the bootstrapped standard errors to conduct statistical 
inferences. The standard errors are estimated using 500 bootstrap replications. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Univariate results 
Table 2 shows the univariate results for the hypothesis tests. The mean DA (DA) is 
0.0175 (0.0057) for the high InsiDebt subsample, which is significantly lower than that for 
the low InsiDebt subsample (t-stat.=-3.83 (-3.98)). This indicates that firms with high CEO 
relative leverage generally have lower abnormal accruals than firms with low CEO relative 
leverage. The mean difference of -0.0092 (-0.0098) in DA (DA) between the two subsamples 
accounts for 37.25% (73.13%) of the mean value of DA (DA) for the whole sample (i.e., 
0.0247 (0.0134) reported in Table 1) and thus is economically significant. The average DD 
for firms with high InsiDebt is significantly lower by 4.50 percentage points (t-stat.= -9.74) 
than the average DD for firms with low InsiDebt, indicating lower accruals quality for firms 
that have high CEO relative leverage. The mean difference of -0.0450 in DD accounts for 
36.64 percent of the average DD for the whole sample and hence is economically significant. 
The incidence of an earnings misstatement is significantly lower for firms with high InsiDebt 
compared to firms with low InsiDebt (0.0490 versus 0.0871, t-stat.=-5.86), indicating that 
firms with high CEO relative leverage have a lower incidence of an earnings misstatement. 
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The mean difference in Res between the two subsamples is -0.0380, which accounts for 48.22 
percent of the sample mean of Res and thus is economically significant. Overall, the 
univariate results lend initial support to the notion that high CEO inside debt holdings lead to 
high financial reporting quality.  
 
5.2. Multivariate regression results 
Table 3 reports the regression results for the test of the impact of CEO inside debt 
holdings on abnormal accruals. Under both DA and DA model, the coefficients on InsiDebt 
are negative and highly significant at the 1% level (t-stat.=-2.98 and -3.59, respectively). This 
indicates that firms with higher CEO inside debt holdings are less likely to engage in 
accounting discretion. A one standard deviation increase in InsiDebt leads to a decrease in 
DA (DA) by 0.0033 (0.0040), which accounts for 13.36% (29.85%) of the mean value of 
DA (DA) for my sample and is economically significant. The coefficients on Debt are also 
negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that higher outside debt holdings lead to 
less accounting discretion. This reconciles with the prior evidence (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 
1997; Bharath et al. 2008) as to the role of outside debt as a mechanism for a firm to commit 
to high financial transparency. The coefficients on ROA are significantly positive at the 1% 
level, which is consistent with prior findings (e.g., Dechow et al. 1995) that abnormal 
accruals are positively related to earnings performance. The coefficient on Insti takes on a 
positive sign and is statistically significant in the DA model, which reconciles with the prior 
view (e.g., Bushee 2001) that institutional investors could pressure managers into managing 
earnings to achieve short-term earnings growth.  
Table 4 presents the regression results for the test of the impact of CEO inside debt 
holdings on accruals quality. InsiDebt has a negative and statistically significant coefficient 
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(t-stat.=-3.97), indicating that large CEO inside debt increases accruals quality. A one 
standard deviation increase in InsiDebt decreases DD by 0.0138, which accounts for 11.24 
percent of the sample mean of DD and thus is economically significant. CEOowner is 
positively associated with DD, which reconciles with the prior evidence (e.g., Bergstresser 
and Philippon 2006) that higher CEO equity ownership is associated with lower accruals 
quality. As expected, Stdcfo has a significantly positive coefficient, suggesting that firms with 
higher operational risk tend to have lower accruals quality. Indp and Debt are both 
statistically significant in the expected negative sign, which suggests that more outside debt 
or more independent directors contribute to higher accruals quality. Consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Francis et al. 2008), the coefficient for ROA is significantly negative, suggesting 
that high operating efficiency reflected by high ROA is associated with low volatility of 
accruals and high accruals quality.  
Table 5 presents the regression results for the test of the impact of CEO inside debt 
holdings on the incidence of an earnings misstatement. The coefficient on InsiDebt is 
significantly negative at the conventional 5% level, indicating that firms with higher CEO 
inside debt holdings are less likely to misstate earnings. The marginal effect of InsiDebt, 
d(Prob.Res)/d(Std.InsiDebt), amounts to -2.14%, which indicates that a one standard 
deviation increase in InsiDebt decreases the likelihood of an earnings misstatement by 2.14 
percentage points. The decrease of 0.0214 accounts for 27.16 percent of the sample mean of 
Res and is economically significant. The negative impact of the CEO relative leverage is also 
evident when the dependent variable is replaced by an indicator variable coded as 1 for firms 
that have an intentional misstatement (i.e., a misstatement caused by irregularities rather than 
unintentional errors).  
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The coefficient on Debt is significantly negative, which again lends support to creditors’ 
effective monitoring of a firm’s financial reporting. Indp also has a significantly negative 
coefficient, indicating that more independent directors lead to a lower likelihood of an 
earnings misstatement. StdSales has a significantly positive coefficient, suggesting that high 
operational uncertainty characterized by high sales volatility leads to a high incidence of an 
earnings misstatement. Loss (Size) takes on a significantly positive (negative) coefficient, 
indicating that loss (big) firm tend to have a high (low) incidence of an earnings misstatement. 
The coefficient for Big4 is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that Big-4 auditors 
are more capable of detecting earnings misstatements than non-Big-4 auditors.  
Table 6 shows the regression results for the test of the impact of CEO inside debt 
holdings on the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts. The coefficient 
for InsiDebt is negative and statistically significant at the conventional 5% level, suggesting 
that firms with larger inside debt have a lower incidence of meeting or beating analyst 
earnings forecasts. The marginal effect of InsiDebt, d(Prob.AnaSur)/d(Std.InsiDebt), amounts 
to -2.13%, indicating that a one standard deviation increase in InsiDebt leads to a decrease in 
the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts by 2.13 percentage points. The 
decrease of 0.0213 accounts for 22.47 percent of the sample mean of AnaSur and thus is 
economically significant. As expected, the coefficients for Debt and Loss are negative and 
statistically significant, which indicates that firms with high outside debt holdings or negative 
operating income tend to have a low incidence of meeting or beating analyst earnings 
forecasts. The coefficient on Size is significantly positive, suggesting that larger firms are 
more capable of managing earnings to meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts. By and large, 
the multivariate results in Table 3-6 support the prediction that larger CEO inside debt is 
associated with higher financial reporting quality. 
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Table 7 presents the two-stage regression results for the hypothesis tests. In the first-step 
probit estimation, CEO relative leverage (InsiDebt) is significantly positively related to the 
state individual income tax rate (StateWage) and negatively associated with the mortgage 
subsidy rate (StateInterest). This is consistent with the notion that CEOs who are subject to 
high individual income tax prefer debt compensation and thereby contribute to high relative 
leverage of their firms. The partial F-statistics are all well above the cutoff point of 11.59 and 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level, suggesting that the models are not subject to weak 
instrument problems (Stock et al. 2002; Larcker and Rusticus 2010).8 The second-step 
regression results for DA, DA, DD, Res, and AnaSur models all show a significantly 
negative coefficient for the fitted CEO relative leverage (InsiDebt). This corroborates that the 
regression results reported in Table 3-6 are robust to correcting for endogeneity and that the 
positive association between CEO relative leverage and financial reporting quality is not 
driven by unobservable firm/CEO characteristics.  
The firm-fixed effect model is widely used in empirical research to control for cross- 
sectional heterogeneity and to mitigate endogeneity problems. However, an effective 
firm-fixed effect model requires that the dependent variable display sufficient within-firm 
variation over time (Wooldrige 2000). Unlike DA and DA, which are calculated for an 
annual interval, DD is computed over a five-year rolling window and thus has little 
time-series variation. Res and Anasur, which are binary variables, also lack time-series 
variation. Hence, as a supplementary test, I apply the firm-fixed effect model only to the DA 
and DA specifications. The firm-fixed effect regression results (not tabulated) are 
qualitatively the same as those reported in Table 3.  
 
                                                 
8 According to Stock et al. (2002), when there are two instruments in the first-stage regression, the 
F-statistic for the instruments needs to be above 11.59 to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
weak.  
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6. Additional Tests 
6.1. The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on firm-specific stock price crash risk 
This section investigates the effect of CEO inside debt holdings on firm-specific stock 
price crash risk. A stock price crash results from the hoarding of bad news within a firm. 
Recent theoretical and empirical evidence (Jin and Myers 2006; Bleck and Liu 2007; Hutton 
et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011) reveals that high financial reporting quality mitigates 
firm-specific stock price crash risk. If CEO inside debt contributes to high financial reporting 
quality, firms would have greater transparency and less latitude in hoarding bad news. 
Accordingly, stock price crash risk should be lower for firms with larger CEO inside debt. To 
test the prediction, I employ the following pooled probit regression model.              
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10
Crash InsiDebt Tradevol Stdret Meanret
Size Mb Debt ROA Salesgrowth Insti
    
      
     
     
                (4) 
Crash is an indicator variable for whether a firm experiences one or more firm-specific 
weekly returns falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns 
over a fiscal year, where the firm-specific weekly returns measure follows Hutton et al. 
(2009).9 InsiDebt is an indicator variable for CEO relative leverage which is defined 
previously.  
Following Chen et al. (2001), Hutton et al. (2009), and Kim et al. (2011), I control for 
the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns (StdRet), the mean of firm-specific 
weekly returns (MeanRet), the average monthly share turnover (Tradevol), firm size (Size), 
market-to-book ratio (Mb), return on assets (ROA), sales growth (Salesgrowth), institutional 
ownership (Insti), and firm leverage (Debt). All the control variables are defined in appendix 
                                                 
9 The results qualitatively hold if I measure the stock price crash risk by the negative skewness of 
firm-specific weekly stock returns over a fiscal year (Kim et al. 2011).  
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I. Model (4) links the proxies for crash risk in fiscal year t to the CEO inside debt measure in 
fiscal year t-1 and to the set of control variables in fiscal year t-1.  
Table 8 presents the regression results. The coefficient on InsiDebt is statistically 
significant with an expected negative sign (-0.0917 with p=0.018), which supports the 
prediction that CEO inside debt holdings reduce firm-specific stock price crash risk. The 
marginal effect of InsiDebt, d(Prob.Crash)/d(Std.InsiDebt) (not tabulated), amounts to -3.1%. 
This indicates that a one standard deviation increase in InsiDebt decreases the incidence of a 
stock price crash by 3.1 percentage points, which accounts for 15.38 percent of the sample 
mean of Crash and is economically significant. The results remain qualitatively unchanged if 
I employ a two-stage instrumental regression for the Crash model. Consistent with Chen et al. 
(2001), Size and StdRet have a significantly positive coefficient, indicating that larger or more 
volatile stocks are more likely to experience a stock price crash. Surprisingly, higher ROA is 
associated with higher crash risk. This might be because high reported operating performance 
could be ascribed to accounting discretion. As expected, the coefficients on Debt, 
Salesgrowth, and MeanRet are negative and statistically significant at the conventional level, 
indicating that stock price crash risk is lower for firms that have larger outside debt, higher 
sales growth, or higher average weekly stock returns within a year.  
 
6.2. The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on the incidence of an auditor-attested material 
internal control weakness  
Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) both require companies to maintain sufficient internal control 
over financial reporting and to provide periodic auditor-attested assessment of internal 
control effectiveness. The internal control is designed to assure the accuracy and reliability of 
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accounting information. Weak internal control would bring about material errors in a firm’s 
financial reports. Prior research (e.g., Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaif et al. 2009) 
documents that ineffective internal control allows or introduces both intentional and 
unintentional misstatements into financial reporting, thereby resulting in lower accruals 
quality. Feng et al. (2009) show that ineffective internal control also reduces the quality of 
internal financial reports, which in turn leads to less accuracy of management earnings 
guidance. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011) also contend the positive 
impact of effective internal control on the quality of financial reporting.  
To the extent that firms with high CEO inside debt holdings are inclined to promote high 
financial reporting quality, they should have an incentive to improve their internal controls. 
Accordingly, auditors are likely to consider the firms as having low control risk, that is, 
auditors are less likely to report a material internal control weakness for firms that have large 
CEO inside debt. Therefore large CEO inside debt is expected to be negatively associated 
with the incidence of an auditor-attested material internal control weakness. I use the 
following pooled probit regression model to test the prediction. 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14
404
Re 4
ICW InsiDebt Auditchange Firmage Loss
ROA Numseg ForeignTran Mb Salesgrowth
struct Indp IndpShare Insti Big
    
    
     
     
    
    
            (5) 
ICW404 takes value of 1 if a firm has a material internal control weakness attested to by 
auditors under SOX Section 404 over a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. Since auditor change is 
associated with weak internal control (e.g., Zhang et al. 2007; Hoitash et al. 2009), I control 
for Auditchange, which equals 1 if a firm changes its auditor for a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. 
As prior studies (e.g., Hoitash et al. 2009) document that poorly governed firms are more 
likely to have weak internal controls, I include the same four corporate governance variables 
as those included in model (1), namely, Indp, IndpShare, Insti, and Big4. Other control 
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variables include firm age (Firmage), financial health (proxied by loss and ROA), firm 
complexity (proxied by Numseg and ForeignTran), growth (proxied by Mb and Salesgrowth), 
and firm restructuring (Restruct), which relate to a firm’s internal control quality (Doyle et al. 
2007). All the control variables are defined in appendix I.  
Table 9 reports the regression results. The coefficient on InsiDebt is negative and 
significant at the 5% level (-0.2050, p=0.045), which is consistent with the prediction that 
higher managerial ownership of debt is associated with a lower likelihood of an auditor- 
attested material internal control weakness. The marginal effect of InsiDebt (not tabulated) 
indicates that a one standard deviation increase in InsiDebt significantly decreases the 
incidence of an auditor-attested material internal control weakness by up to 5.2 percentage 
points. The results are not sensitive to the two-stage instrumental regression estimation. The 
coefficients on Auditchange, Numseg, Loss, and Indp are statistically significant in the 
expected sign after controlling for the endogeneity. This indicates that auditors are more 
likely to attest to a material internal control weakness for firms that have an auditor switch, 
more business segments, a loss in operating income, or fewer independent directors.       
Pursuant to Section 303 of SOX and Item 307 of Regulation S-K, managers are also 
required to disclose a material internal control weakness whenever they observe such 
weakness. So I rerun equation (5) where the dependent variable is replaced with ICW303. 
ICW303 equals 1 if a firm discloses a self-identified material internal control weakness over a 
fiscal year and 0 otherwise. The results (not tabulated) indicate that larger CEO inside debt 
leads to a lower likelihood of a material internal control weakness. Hence the results on 
ICW303 complement the results on ICW404 in revealing that inside debt does motivate 
managers to improve internal controls to prevent financial misreporting.  
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7. Conclusion 
Numerous studies have documented that executive bonus and equity compensation 
creates managerial incentives to engage in accounting discretion. Overlooked almost entirely 
is the role of executive debt compensation in financial reporting due to the limited disclosure 
of executive debt compensation components. Using the CEO pension and deferred 
compensation data available from 2006 to 2011, this study provides the first evidence on how 
CEO inside debt affects financial reporting quality.  
Theory offers competing predictions. On the one hand, inside debt holders focus on a 
firm’s long-term prospect and are risk-averse. Hence CEOs with much inside debt are 
sensitive to the negative consequences of financial misreporting arising in a firm in the long 
run and tend to refrain from financial misreporting. In addition, CEO inside debt may 
exacerbate the agency conflict of equity, increasing shareholders’ demand for high financial 
reporting quality. But on the other hand, CEO inside debt mitigates equity-debt conflicts and 
may reduce creditors’ demand for conservative accounting, which thereby leads to a higher 
likelihood of misreporting. Overall, the empirical findings support the first prediction. In 
particular, firms with higher CEO inside debt holdings exhibit lower abnormal accruals, 
higher accruals quality, a lower likelihood of an earnings misstatement, and a lower incidence 
of meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts. This suggests that high CEO inside debt 
holdings induce high quality financial reporting. Furthermore, I find that CEO inside debt 
holdings mitigate the stock price crash risk of a firm, which is consistent with the rationale 
that larger CEO inside debt leads to higher financial transparency and less latitude in bad 
news hoarding within a firm. I also find that firms with higher CEO inside debt holdings have 
a lower likelihood of an auditor-attested material internal control weakness, suggesting that 
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firms with large CEO inside debt are less likely to have a material weakness in internal 
control over financial reporting.  
Overall, by corroborating the role of inside debt in promoting high financial reporting 
quality and in mitigating stock price crash risk and internal control weakness, this study 
highlights the importance of inside debt in the design of an optimal executive compensation 
contract, which should be of particular interests to board of directors. This paper, however, is 
subject to two limitations. First, despite efforts to address endogeneity, I cannot completely 
eliminate it. Second, CEOs may not have a long-term focus for future firm prospect if their 
inside debt is close to “maturity.” But unlike outside debt, inside debt has no explicit maturity 
date because the expected retirement ages of CEOs are quite uncertain. In the United States, 
there is no mandatory retirement age for CEOs, and CEOs can work as long as they are 
qualified for the job position. Also, the future year in which a CEO wishes to retire may keep 
changing over time. Due to this uncertainty, the inside debt maturity information is not 
readily available. This prevents me from further investigating whether the positive effect of 
CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality is weaker for short-term CEO inside 
debt. I leave this question as an avenue for future research. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Std.dev. Median 
Num. of 
firm-years 
Num. of 
unique firms 
Main variables      
DA 0.0247 0.1346 0.0115 5596 1285 
DA 0.0134 0.1362 0.0072 5596 1285 
DD 0.1228 0.1650 0.0704 4238 1137 
Res 0.0788 0.2695 0 7547 1680 
AnaSur 0.0948 0.2930 0 5685 1572 
InsiDebt 0.2161 0.4116 0 7547 1680 
Control variables      
 Insti 0.7681 0.2763 0.8316 7547 1680 
 IndpShare 0.0080 0.0339 0.0007 7547 1680 
 CEOowner 1.9862 5.5427 0.1280 7547 1680 
 Vega 1.3777 1.7879 0.2755 7547 1680 
 Big4 0.0970 0.2960 0 7547 1680 
 Indp 0.8687 0.6507 1.1429 7547 1680 
 Loss 0.1745 0.3796 0 7547 1680 
 ROA 0.0484 0.7375 0.0525 7547 1680 
 Size 7.4314 1.5695 7.2886 7547 1680 
 Mb 2.8857 20.4541 1.7613 7547 1680 
 AnaCov 1.1917 0.6546 1 7547 1680 
 Debt 0.2110 3.6704 0.1442 7547 1680 
 SalesGrowth 0.1239 0.6528 0.0825 7547 1680 
 StdCash 0.0430 0.0618 0.0290 7547 1680 
 StdSales 0.3024 8.7714 0.0778 7547 1680 
 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the regression analyses. The sample incorporates 
firm-year observations that contain CEO inside debt information over the period of 2006-2011. The number of firm-year 
observations varies due to the data requirements in constructing different financial reporting quality proxies for the regression 
analyses. DA is the absolute value of abnormal accruals, estimated using the cross-sectional modified Jones model with at 
least 20 firms for each year and two-digit SIC-code industry. DA is the signed value of the abnormal accruals. DD is the 
standard deviation of residuals from the modified Dechow and Dichev model proposed by Francis et al. (2005). The modified 
Dechow and Dichev regression model is estimated for each two-digit SIC-code industry-year in which there are at least 20 
firms. Res is equal to 1 if a firm’s financial report is misstated for a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. AnaSur equals 1 if a firm meets 
or beats the median consensus analyst earnings forecast by 1 percent over a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. InsiDebt takes value of 
1 if the ratio of CEO personal leverage to firm leverage exceeds 1 for a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. CEO personal leverage is 
measured as the sum of actuarial present value of pension and deferred compensation divided by the value of CEO stock and 
stock option holdings. Firm leverage is calculated as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by market 
value of stockholder equity. The control variables are defined in appendix I. 
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Table 2 Univariate test 
 
Variable 
InsiDebt=1  InsiDebt=0 Mean difference 
(t-stat.) 
Num. of 
firm-years Mean  Mean 
DA 0.0175  0.0267 
-0.0092 
 (-3.83)*** 
5596 
DA 0.0057  0.0155 
   -0.0098  
(-3.98)*** 
5596 
DD 0.0872  0.1322 
       -0.0450  
(-9.74)*** 
4238 
Res 0.0490  0.0871 
-0.0380  
(-5.86)*** 
7547 
AnaSur 0.0898  0.0964 
   -0.0066 
(-0.72) 
5685 
 
Notes: This table reports the univariate results. The sample incorporates firm-year observations that contain CEO 
inside debt information over the period of 2006-2011. DA is the absolute value of abnormal accruals, estimated 
using the cross-sectional modified Jones model with at least 20 firms for each year and two-digit SIC-code industry. 
DA is the signed value of the abnormal accruals. DD is the standard deviation of residuals from the modified 
Dechow and Dichev model proposed by Francis et al. (2005). The modified Dechow and Dichev regression model 
is estimated for each two-digit SIC-code industry-year in which there are at least 20 firms. Res equals 1 if a firm’s 
financial report is misstated for a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. AnaSur equals 1 if a firm meets or beats the median 
consensus analyst earnings forecast by 1 percent over a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. InsiDebt takes value of 1 if the 
ratio of CEO personal leverage to firm leverage exceeds 1 for a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. CEO personal leverage 
is measured as the sum of actuarial present value of pension and deferred compensation divided by the value of CEO 
stock and stock option holdings. Firm leverage is calculated as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities divided by market value of stockholder equity.  
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed tests), respectively.  
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Table 3 
The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on abnormal accruals 
  
Variable  Pred. sign      DA       DA 
Intercept 
 
? 
     0.0376 
(4.91)*** 
 -0.0028 
      (-0.36) 
InsiDebt             
 
- 
    -0.0080 
    (-2.98)*** 
 -0.0096 
    (-3.59)*** 
IndpShare 
 
- 
     -0.0027 
    (-0.15) 
 0.0096 
(0.53) 
CEOowner 
 
      + 
 0.0001 
(0.42) 
 0.0002 
(0.66) 
Vega                                    
 
+ 
    -0.0011 
    (-1.61) 
 -0.0005 
      (-0.68) 
Big4 
 
- 
     0.0002 
    (0.04) 
 -0.0015 
(-0.32) 
Indp 
 
- 
    -0.0007 
    (-0.52) 
 -0.0015 
(-1.16) 
Loss                              
 
?
    -0.0028 
    (-0.67) 
 -0.0100 
(-2.34)** 
ROA 
 
+ 
    0.0275 
    (2.62)*** 
 0.0365 
      (3.60)*** 
Size 
 
? 
    -0.0008        
    (-0.96) 
 0.0005 
(0.51) 
Mb 
 
+ 
    0.00003 
 (1.41) 
 0.00002 
(0.78) 
AnaCov 
 
- 
    0.0006 
    (0.39) 
 0.0003 
(0.16) 
Debt 
 
- 
    -0.0055 
    (-2.63)*** 
 -0.0072 
(-3.60)*** 
SalesGrowth 
 
+ 
    0.0045 
    (1.37) 
 0.0085 
(1.41) 
StdCash 
 
+ 
    0.0365 
    (1.64) 
 0.0411 
(1.97)** 
StdSales 
 
+ 
    -0.00001 
    (-0.54) 
 0.00001 
(1.12) 
Insti 
 
? 
 0.0044 
 (1.02) 
 0.0102 
(2.38)** 
       
Marginal effect: d(DAor 
DA)/d(Std.InsiDebt) 
 
- 
 
-0.0033  -0.0040 
Num. of firm-years        5596  5596 
Adj. R2        0.024  0.062 
 
Notes: This table reports the OLS regression results for the tests of the impact of CEO inside debt holdings on abnormal 
accruals. The sample period ranges from 2006 to 2011. DA is the absolute value of abnormal accruals, estimated using 
the cross-sectional modified Jones model with at least 20 firms for each year and two-digit SIC-code industry. DA is the 
signed value of the abnormal accruals. InsiDebt takes value of 1 if the ratio of CEO personal leverage to firm leverage is 
greater than 1 over a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. CEO personal leverage is measured as the sum of actuarial present value 
of pension and deferred compensation divided by the value of CEO stock and stock option holdings. Firm leverage is 
calculated as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by market value of stockholder equity. The 
control variables are defined in appendix I. Year dummies are included in the regression but not reported for brevity. 
The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.  
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed tests), respectively.  
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Table 4 
The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on accruals quality 
  
Variable  Pred. sign  DD 
Intercept             
 
? 
 0.1156 
(3.89)*** 
InsiDebt             
 
- 
 -0.0331 
(-3.97)*** 
IndpShare 
 
- 
 -0.0969 
(-1.36) 
CEOowner 
 
+ 
 0.0020 
(2.21)** 
Vega                                    
 
+ 
 0.0010 
(0.33) 
Big4 
 
      - 
 0.0195 
(0.97) 
Indp 
 
- 
 -0.0212 
(-3.31)*** 
Loss                              
 
? 
 0.0119 
(1.44) 
ROA 
 
- 
 -0.0022 
(-5.54)*** 
Size 
 
? 
 0.0020 
(0.49) 
Mb 
 
+ 
 -0.0001 
(-1.31) 
AnaCov 
 
- 
 0.0045 
(1.02) 
Debt 
 
- 
            -0.9115 
(-4.54)*** 
SalesGrowth 
 
+ 
 0.0010 
(0.26) 
StdCash 
 
+ 
 0.2591 
(3.73)*** 
StdSales 
 
+ 
 0.0003 
(0.46) 
Insti 
 
     ? 
 0.0037 
(0.22) 
     
Marginal effect: d(DD)/ 
d(Std.InsiDebt) 
 
- 
 
-0.0138 
Num. of firm-years                     4238 
Adj. R2              0.057 
 
Notes: This table reports the OLS regression results for the test of the impact of CEO inside debt holdings on accruals 
quality. The sample period ranges from 2006 to 2011. DD is the standard deviation of residuals from the modified 
Dechow and Dichev regression model proposed by Francis et al. (2005). The modified Dechow and Dichev 
regression model is estimated for each two-digit SIC-code industry-year in which there are at least 20 firms. Larger 
DD represents poorer accruals quality. InsiDebt takes value of 1 if the ratio of CEO personal leverage to firm leverage 
exceeds 1 for a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. CEO personal leverage is measured as the sum of actuarial present value 
of pension and deferred compensation divided by the value of CEO stock and stock option holdings. Firm leverage is 
calculated as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by market value of stockholder equity. 
The control variables are defined in appendix I. Year dummies are included in the regression but not reported for 
brevity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.  
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed tests), respectively.  
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Table 5 
The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on the likelihood of an earnings 
misstatement 
  
Variable  Pred. sign  Res 
Intercept             
 
? 
 -0.8122 
(<0.001)*** 
InsiDebt             
 
- 
 -0.1770 
(0.013)** 
IndpShare 
 
- 
 -0.8569 
(0.243) 
CEOowner 
 
      + 
 0.0054 
(0.159) 
Vega                                    
 
+ 
 0.0228 
(0.182) 
Big4 
 
+ 
 0.2072 
(0.003)*** 
Indp 
 
- 
 -0.0915 
(0.041)** 
Loss                              
 
+ 
 0.1611 
(0.022)** 
ROA 
 
? 
 -0.2787 
(0.170) 
Size 
 
? 
 -0.0687 
(<0.001)*** 
Mb 
 
+ 
 -0.0002 
(0.843) 
AnaCov 
 
- 
            -0.0582 
(0.107) 
Debt 
 
- 
 -0.4137 
(0.008)*** 
SalesGrowth 
 
+ 
 -0.0064 
(0.770) 
StdCash 
 
+ 
 -0.1470 
(0.692) 
StdSales 
 
+ 
 0.0053 
(<0.001)*** 
Insti 
 
? 
 0.0355 
(0.709) 
     
Marginal effect: d(Prob.Res) 
/d(Std.InsiDebt) 
 
- 
 
-0.0214 
Num. of firm-years                      7547 
Pseudo R2               0.047 
 
Notes: This table reports the probit regression results for the test of the impact of CEO inside debt holdings on the 
likelihood of an earnings misstatement. The sample period ranges from 2006 to 2011. The dependent variable, Res, 
equals 1 if a firm’s financial report is misstated for a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. InsiDebt takes value of 1 if the ratio 
of CEO personal leverage to firm leverage exceeds 1 for a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. CEO personal leverage is 
measured as the sum of actuarial present value of pension and deferred compensation divided by the value of CEO 
stock and stock option holdings. Firm leverage is calculated as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities divided by market value of stockholder equity. The control variables are defined in appendix I. Year 
dummies are included in the regression but not reported for brevity. The p-values in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm.  
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed tests), respectively.  
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Table 6 
The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst 
earnings forecasts 
  
Variable  Pred. sign           AnaSur 
Intercept 
 
? 
 -1.7038 
(<0.001)*** 
InsiDebt             
 
- 
 -0.1458 
(0.015)** 
IndpShare 
 
- 
 -0.5664 
(0.530) 
CEOowner 
 
      + 
 0.0051 
(0.342) 
Vega                                    
 
+ 
 -0.0166 
(0.303) 
Big4 
 
- 
 -0.0124 
(0.873) 
Indp 
 
- 
 -0.0229 
(0.661) 
Loss                              
 
- 
 -0.1897 
(0.045)** 
ROA 
 
? 
 0.3596 
(0.284) 
Size 
 
? 
 0.0718 
(<0.001)*** 
Mb 
 
+ 
 -0.0006 
(0.635) 
AnaCov 
 
- 
             0.0425 
(0.209) 
Debt 
 
- 
 -0.4206 
(0.007)*** 
SalesGrowth 
 
+ 
 -0.1589 
(0.067)* 
StdCash 
 
+ 
 -1.2449 
(0.068)* 
StdSales 
 
+ 
 -0.0815 
(0.729) 
Insti 
 
? 
 -0.0393 
(0.666) 
     
Marginal effect: d(Prob.AnaSur) 
/d(Std.InsiDebt) 
 
- 
 
                 -0.0213 
Num. of firm-years                      5685 
Pseudo R2               0.020 
 
Notes: This table reports the probit regression results for the test of the impact of CEO inside debt holdings on the 
likelihood of meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts. The sample period ranges from 2006 to 2011. The dependent 
variable, Anasur, equals 1 if a firm meets or beats the median consensus analyst earnings forecast by 1 percent for a fiscal 
year and 0 otherwise. InsiDebt takes value of 1 if the ratio of CEO personal leverage to firm leverage exceeds 1 for a fiscal 
year and 0 otherwise. CEO personal leverage is measured as the sum of actuarial present value of pension and deferred 
compensation divided by the value of CEO stock and stock option holdings. Firm leverage is calculated as the sum of 
long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by market value of stockholder equity. The control variables are 
defined in appendix I. Year dummies are included in the regression but not reported for brevity. The p-values in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.  
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed tests), respectively.  
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Table 7 
Test of endogeneity: the effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality 
  
Variable 
 1st Stage 2nd Stage  1st Stage 2nd Stage  1st Stage 2nd Stage  1st Stage 2nd Stage 
InsiDebt DA DA  InsiDebt DD  InsiDebt Res  InsiDebt AnaSur 
Intercept 
 -2.2619 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0075 
(0.382) 
-0.0204 
(0.038)** 
 -2.2604 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0588 
(0.139) 
 -2.1265 
(<0.001)*** 
-1.0275 
(<0.001)***  
 -1.9335 
(<0.001)*** 
 -1.7444 
(<0.001)*** 
InsiDebt             
  -0.0651 
(0.019)** 
-0.1158 
(0.001)*** 
  -0.1352 
(0.028)** 
  -1.6348 
(0.006)*** 
  -0.6476 
(0.041)** 
StateWage 
 0.0527 
(0.005)*** 
   0.0486 
(0.008)*** 
  0.0419 
(0.003)*** 
  0.0414 
(0.007)*** 
 
StateInterest 
 -0.0539 
(<0.001)*** 
   -0.0579 
(<0.001)*** 
  -0.0429 
(0.001)*** 
  -0.0444 
(0.001)*** 
 
Loss                              
 -0.1186 
(0.186) 
-0.0037 
(0.402) 
-0.0110 
(0.011)** 
 -0.0733 
(0.478) 
0.0153 
(0.123) 
 -0.0774 
(0.306) 
0.1455 
(0.033)** 
 -0.0772 
(0.386) 
-0.1840 
(0.051)* 
Salesgrowth 
 -0.5214 
(0.004)*** 
0.0034 
(0.621) 
0.0065 
(0.606) 
 -0.7441 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0006 
(0.957) 
 -0.4974 
(0.001)*** 
-0.0396 
(0.727) 
 -0.5316 
(0.003)*** 
-0.1788 
(0.058)* 
Size 
 0.2254 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0028 
(0.087)* 
0.0073 
(0.001)*** 
 0.2199 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0081 
(0.216) 
 0.2119 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0167 
(0.677) 
 0.2015 
(<0.001)*** 
0.1007 
(<0.001)*** 
Mb 
 -0.0188 
(0.149) 
0.00002 
(0.905) 
0.00001 
(0.963) 
 -0.0105 
(0.356) 
-0.0001 
(0.952) 
 -0.0100 
(0.244) 
-0.0002 
(0.988) 
 -0.0066 
 (0.434) 
-0.0009 
(0.800) 
Debt 
 -0.7356 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0074 
(0.274) 
-0.0108 
(0.178) 
 -0.6746 
(0.002)*** 
-0.0060 
(0.860) 
 -0.8066 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.6569 
(0.001)*** 
 -0.8441 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.4276 
(0.007)*** 
Insti 
 -0.1074 
(0.379) 
0.0015 
(0.724) 
0.0048 
(0.269) 
 -0.1161 
(0.430) 
-0.0001 
(0.992) 
 -0.1046 
(0.320) 
-0.0272 
(0.791) 
 -0.1706 
(0.151) 
-0.0641 
(0.497) 
Indp 
 0.0644 
(0.237) 
0.0002 
(0.860) 
0.0002 
(0.903) 
 0.0857 
(0.163) 
-0.0188 
(0.007)*** 
 0.0591 
(0.201) 
-0.0723 
(0.103) 
 0.0144 
(0.774) 
-0.0452 
(0.456) 
ROA 
 0.9002 
(0.005)*** 
0.0370 
(0.006)*** 
0.0542 
(<0.001)*** 
 1.0761 
(0.003)*** 
0.0275 
(0.418) 
 0.8984 
(0.001)*** 
-0.1435 
(0.544) 
 0.9923 
(0.004)*** 
0.5023 
(0.145) 
IndpShare 
 0.3963 
(0.671) 
-0.0003 
(0.988) 
0.0142 
(0.454) 
 0.7633 
(0.493) 
-0.0788 
(0.296) 
 0.0514 
(0.948) 
-0.8753 
(0.353) 
 0.3544 
(0.702) 
-0.5057 
(0.664) 
Big4 
 0.1596 
(0.065)* 
0.0015 
(0.722) 
0.0010 
(0.840) 
 0.0924 
(0.371) 
0.0188 
(0.339) 
 0.0952 
(0.192) 
0.2329 
(0.001)*** 
 0.1015 
(0.206) 
-0.0069 
(0.929) 
AnaCov 
 -0.0149 
(0.669) 
0.0006 
(0.748) 
0.0001 
(0.934) 
 0.0312 
(0.423) 
0.0060 
(0.198) 
 -0.0144 
(0.649) 
-0.0627 
(0.110) 
 -0.0018 
(0.958) 
0.0445 
(0.179) 
Vega                                     
 -0.0588 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0020 
(0.023)** 
0.0022 
(0.030)** 
 -0.0496 
(0.013)** 
-0.0003 
(0.919) 
 -0.0559 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0026 
(0.887) 
 -0.0538 
(<0.001)*** 
-0.0241 
(0.141) 
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CEOowner 
 -0.0564 
(0.075)* 
-0.0002 
(0.512) 
-0.0005 
(0.250) 
 -0.0435 
(0.112) 
0.0015 
(0.106) 
 -0.0558 
(0.010)*** 
-0.0017 
(0.785) 
 -0.0864 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0001 
(0.989) 
StdCash 
 -0.6135 
(0.389) 
0.0342 
(0.175) 
0.0368 
(0.122) 
 -1.0820 
(0.160) 
0.2544 
(0.001)*** 
 -0.7539 
(0.233) 
-0.2313 
(0.689) 
 -0.8228 
(0.267) 
-1.2896 
(0.067)* 
StdSales 
 0.0064 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0001 
(0.997) 
0.0002 
(0.993) 
 0.0064 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0005 
(0.979) 
 0.0064 
(<0.001)*** 
0.0077 
(0.934) 
 0.3411 
(0.153) 
-0.1004 
(0.616) 
              
Partial F-statistic 
for instruments 
40.67 
(<0.001)*** 
   35.07 
(<0.001)*** 
  34.05 
(<0.001)*** 
  27.70 
(<0.001)*** 
 
Num. of  
firm-years 
 
5596 5596 5596  4238 4238  7547 7547  5685 5685 
Adj./Pseudo R2  0.119 0.028 0.084  0.119 0.047  0.110 0.049  0.114 0.020 
 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the tests of the endogeneity between CEO inside debt holdings and financial reporting quality. Two-stage instrumental variable regressions are 
used in the tests. The sample period ranges from 2006 to 2011. The first-step probit estimate shows the determinants of the indicator for CEO relative leverage (InsiDebt). InsiDebt is the predicted 
indicator variable for CEO relative leverage, where CEO relative leverage is as defined previously in Table 3-6. The instruments, StateWage and StateInterest, are the maximum tax rate for 
wages and the maximum mortgage subsidy rate faced by a CEO in the state in which his or her firm is headquartered, respectively. In the second-stage estimates of the regressions, dependent 
variables are DA, DA, DD, Res, and AnaSur, respectively. DA is the absolute value of abnormal accruals, estimated using the cross-sectional modified Jones model with at least 20 firms for each 
year and two-digit SIC-code industry. DA is the signed value of the abnormal accruals. DD is the standard deviation of residuals from the modified Dechow and Dichev regression model proposed 
by Francis et al. (2005). The modified Dechow and Dichev regression model is estimated for each two-digit SIC-code industry-year in which there are at least 20 firms. Larger DD represents 
poorer accruals quality. Res equals 1 if a firm’s financial report is misstated for a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. AnaSur equals 1 if a firm meets or beats the median consensus analyst earnings forecast 
by 1 percent over a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. When the dependent variable is DA, DA, or DD (Res or AnaSur), OLS (probit) regression model is used for the second-stage regressions. All the 
control variables are defined in appendix I. Year dummies are included in both the 1st and 2nd stage regressions but not reported for brevity. The p-values in parentheses are based on the standard 
errors clustered by firm and estimated using 500 bootstrap replications. The bootstrapping procedure is used for the second-stage regression to obtain consistent estimators (Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2007). 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed tests), respectively.  
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Table 8 
Additional analysis: the effect of CEO inside debt holdings on firm-specific stock price 
crash risk 
  
Variable 
   (a) 
   Crash 
 (b1) 1st Stage 
    InsiDebt 
 (b2) 2nd stage 
Crash 
Intercept 
 -1.1011 
    (<0.001)*** 
      -2.3171 
(<0.001)*** 
 -1.1634 
  (<0.001)*** 
InsiDebt             
 -0.0917 
 (0.018)** 
   -0.4702 
(0.049)** 
StateWage 
        0.0351 
(0.007)*** 
  
StateInterest 
       -0.0390 
(0.001)*** 
  
Mb                               
 0.0004 
(0.201) 
     -0.0132 
     (0.079)* 
 0.0004 
(0.275) 
ROA 
 0.7428 
    (<0.001)*** 
      1.0006 
(<0.001)*** 
 0.8006 
   (<0.001)*** 
Size 
       0.0349 
 (0.004)*** 
      0.2331 
(<0.001)*** 
 0.0585 
  (0.005)*** 
Debt 
 -0.5364 
    (<0.001)*** 
     -0.6817 
(<0.001)*** 
 -0.5344 
   (<0.001)*** 
Tradevol                             
 0.0037 
(0.356) 
     -0.0579 
(0.007)*** 
 -0.0036 
(0.377) 
Salesgrowth 
 -0.0942 
  (0.039)** 
     -0.4470 
(0.001)*** 
 -0.1028 
  (0.001)*** 
Stdret 
 4.0745  
    (<0.001)*** 
      0.0153 
     (0.491) 
 4.0332 
  (0.027)** 
Meanret 
 -0.2153 
    (<0.001)*** 
      0.0081 
     (0.345) 
 -0.2123 
    (<0.001)*** 
Insti 
 0.1054 
 (0.052)* 
      0.0232 
     (0.416) 
 0.1020 
 (0.053)* 
       
Partial F-statistic for 
instruments 
 
  
33.61 
(<0.001)*** 
 
 
Num. of firm-years  7708       7708  7708 
Pseudo R2  0.042       0.094  0.042 
 
Notes: The table presents the regression results for the tests of the effect of CEO inside debt holdings on firm-specific stock 
price crash risk. The sample period ranges from 2006 to 2011. Column (a) reports the single-equation probit regression results. 
Column (b) reports the two-stage instrumental probit regression results. Crash is equal to 1 if a firm experiences one or more 
firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns over a fiscal year 
and 0 otherwise. InsiDebt takes value of 1 if the ratio of CEO personal leverage to firm leverage exceeds 1 for a fiscal year and 
0 otherwise. CEO personal leverage is measured as the sum of actuarial present value of pension and deferred compensation 
divided by the value of CEO stock and stock option holdings. Firm leverage is calculated as the sum of long-term debt and 
debt in current liabilities divided by market value of stockholder equity. The instruments, StateWage and StateInterest, are the 
maximum tax rate for wages and the maximum mortgage subsidy rate faced by a CEO in the state in which his or her firm is 
headquartered, respectively. All the control variables are defined in appendix I. Year dummies are included in all the 
regressions but not reported for brevity. The p-values in parentheses are based on the standard errors clustered by firm and 
estimated using 500 bootstrap replications.  
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Additional analysis: the effect of CEO inside debt holdings on the incidence of an 
auditor-attested material internal control weakness 
  
Variable 
 (a) 
ICW404 
 (b1) 1st stage 
InsiDebt 
   (b2) 2nd stage 
ICW404 
Intercept 
 -1.5332 
 (<0.001)*** 
 -3.2505 
   (<0.001)*** 
 -2.0317 
 (<0.001)*** 
InsiDebt             
 -0.2050 
(0.045)** 
   -1.9370 
(0.023)** 
StateWage 
   0.0306 
  (0.025)** 
  
StateInterest 
   -0.0190 
 (0.089)* 
  
ForeignTran 
 0.3281 
(0.182) 
 -0.7209 
(0.011)** 
 0.1127 
(0.421) 
Auditchange 
 0.5356 
 (<0.001)*** 
 -0.1488 
(0.130) 
 0.4651 
(0.002)*** 
IndpShare 
 1.0899 
(0.074)* 
 -0.8847 
(0.195) 
 0.8244 
(0.174) 
Big4 
 0.0548 
(0.355) 
 -0.0285 
(0.387) 
 0.0265 
(0.434) 
Indp 
 -0.2807 
(<0.001)*** 
 0.0712 
(0.075)* 
 -0.2594  
(<0.001)*** 
Insti 
 -0.1803 
(0.091)* 
 0.1447 
(0.124) 
 -0.1382 
(0.175) 
Loss                              
 0.3942 
(<0.001)*** 
 -0.2043   
 (0.010)*** 
 0.2795 
(0.012)** 
ROA 
 0.0834 
(0.358) 
 1.3505 
  (<0.001)*** 
 0.2746 
(0.174) 
Mb 
 -0.0154 
(0.234) 
 0.0005 
(0.200) 
 -0.0126 
(0.294) 
Numseg 
 0.0709 
(0.128) 
 0.3626 
 (<0.001)*** 
 0.2102 
(0.017)** 
Restruct 
 -6.2227 
(0.423) 
 -43.8706 
(0.129) 
 -20.8195 
(0.349) 
SalesGrowth 
 -0.0139 
(0.266) 
 -0.3221 
 (0.007)*** 
 -0.0330 
(0.306) 
Firmage 
 -0.0563 
(0.155) 
 0.5047 
  (<0.001)*** 
 0.1439 
(0.126) 
       
Partial F-statistic for 
instruments 
 
 
 32.93 
(<0.001)*** 
 
 
Num. of firm-years  5216  5216  5216 
Pseudo R2  0.100  0.136  0.102 
 
Notes: This table reports the results for the tests of the impact of CEO inside debt holdings on the incidence of an 
auditor-attested material internal control weakness. Column (a) reports the single-equation probit regression results. Column 
(b) reports the two-stage instrumental probit regression results. The sample period ranges from 2006 to 2011. The dependent 
variable, ICW404, equals 1 if a firm has a material internal control weakness attested to by auditors for a fiscal year and 0 
otherwise. InsiDebt takes value of 1 if the ratio of CEO personal leverage to firm leverage is greater than 1 for a fiscal year and 
0 otherwise. CEO personal leverage is measured as the sum of actuarial present value of pension and deferred compensation 
divided by the value of CEO stock and stock option holdings. Firm leverage is calculated as the sum of long-term debt and 
debt in current liabilities divided by market value of stockholder equity. The instruments, StateWage and StateInterest, are the 
maximum tax rate for wages and the maximum mortgage subsidy rate faced by a CEO in the state in which his or her firm is 
headquartered, respectively. All the control variables are defined in appendix I. Year dummies are included in all the 
regressions but not reported for brevity. The p-values in parentheses are based on the standard errors clustered by firm and 
estimated using 500 bootstrap replications.  
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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 Appendix I  Summary of Variable Definitions 
 
Control Variables Definition 
CEOowner The sum of CEOs’ stock and stock option ownership as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding as of the end of a fiscal year. 
Vega The natural logarithm of 1 plus the dollar change in the value of CEOs’ equity 
portfolio for 1% change in stock price volatility. 
IndpShare The sum of all independent directors’ equity ownership as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding as of the end of a fiscal year. 
Indp The proportion of independent directors on the board of directors as of the end 
of a fiscal year. 
Insti Equity ownership of institutional investors as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding as of the end of a fiscal year.  
Loss                              1 if a firm reports loss in operating income for a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. 
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets for a fiscal year. 
Size The natural logarithm of market value of a firm’s common shareholders’ equity 
at the beginning of a fiscal year. 
Mb Market value of common shareholders’ equity divided by book value of 
common shareholders’ equity at the beginning of a fiscal year. 
AnaCov The natural logarithm of the number of analysts following a firm in a fiscal 
year. 
Debt The ratio of long-term debt to total assets at the beginning of a fiscal year. 
SalesGrowth Sales in the current fiscal year divided by sales in the previous fiscal year. 
StdCash The standard deviation of cash flows scaled by total assets for the previous five 
years. 
StdSales The standard deviation of sales scaled by total assets for the previous five years. 
Numseg                                 The natural logarithm of the number of business segments for a fiscal year. 
ForeignTran 1 if a firm has a nonzero foreign currency transaction over a fiscal year and 0 
otherwise. 
Restruct Restructuring charges scaled by total assets for a fiscal year.  
Auditchange 1 if a firm changes its auditor in a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. 
Big4 1 if a firm is audited by Big-4 auditors for a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. 
Firmage The natural logarithm of the number of years from the current year to the year 
when the firm first appeared in the CRSP database. 
Tradevol                             The average monthly share turnover over a fiscal year. The monthly share 
turnover is calculated as monthly trading volume divided by total number of 
shares outstanding during the month. 
Stdret The standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns for a fiscal year. 
Meanret The mean of firm-specific weekly returns for a fiscal year, times 100. 
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                  Appendix II  CEO leverage ratio calculation 
CEO personal leverage ratio is measured as the value of CEO inside debt holdings divided by the 
value of CEO equity holdings. The value of CEO inside debt is calculated as the sum of the actuarial 
present value of accumulated benefits under defined-benefit pension plans and the total balance in the 
deferred compensation plans by the fiscal year-end, both of which are readily available in ExecuComp.  
The value of CEO equity holdings includes the value of both stock and stock option holdings. I 
measure the value of CEO stock holdings by multiplying the number of shares (including restricted shares) 
by the stock price at the firm’s fiscal year-end. The estimate of stock option value held by CEOs is based 
on the following Black-Scholes formula for valuing European call options, modified by Merton (1973) to 
account for dividend payouts. 
1/2( ) ( )dT dTOptionValue Se N Z Xe N Z T     
Where Z = [ln(S/X)+T*(r-d+σ2/2)]/ σT(1/2); 
      N = Cumulative probability function for the normal distribution; 
      S = Price of the underlying stock at a fiscal year-end; 
      X = Exercise price of the stock option; 
      σ = Expected stock return volatility over the life of the stock option; 
      r = Natural logarithm of risk-free interest rate; 
      T = Time-to-maturity of the stock option in years 
      d = Natural logarithm of expected dividend yield over the life of the stock option. 
Following Core and Guay (2002), I employ the above formula to estimate the option value for each of 
the following three groups of stock options held by CEOs: newly granted options in the current year, 
options granted in previous years but not yet exercisable, and options granted in previous years that are 
currently exercisable.  
The expected stock price volatility (σ) is computed from CRSP using monthly returns over the 
previous 60 months. The expected dividend yield (d) is computed from Compustat and averaged over the 
previous three years. Both stock returns volatility (σ) and dividend yield (d) are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. The risk-free interest rate (r) and the fiscal year-end stock price (S) are obtained from 
CRSP.   
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For newly granted options, the exercise price (X) could be directly obtained from ExecuComp. The 
time-to-maturity (T) is calculated as the difference between option expiration date and option grant date, 
where the former is obtained from ExecuCom and the latter is assumed to be July 1 of that year. For 
previously granted options, we need to estimate the exercise price (X) and time-to-maturity (T) since their 
details are not disclosed in the firm’s proxy statements and hence not available in ExecuComp.  
To estimate the exercise price (X) for previously granted options, I use the realizable values (i.e., 
excess of stock price over exercise price) of unexercisable and exercisable options, both of which are 
obtained from ExecuComp. The realizable value of newly granted options is deducted from that of 
unexercisable options. The unexercisable (excluding newly granted options) and exercisable realizable 
values are divided by the number of unexercisable and exercisable options, respectively, to yield an 
average value of how far in-the-money each stock option is. This average value per option is then 
subtracted from the firm’s stock price to generate the estimates of the average exercise price (X) for the 
unexercised unexercisable and unexercised exercisable options, respectively.  
Based on Core and Guay’s (2002) “one-year approximation” (OA) method, the time-to-maturity (T) 
for unexercised unexercisable options is assigned as 1 year less than the newly granted options. The 
time-to-maturity (T) for unexercised exercisable options is assigned as three years less than the newly 
granted options. If no option is newly granted in the current year, the time-to-maturity (T) is set to nine and 
six years for the unexercisable and exercisable options, respectively. Finally, the value of CEO option 
holdings is equal to the sum of the value of newly granted CEO options, the value of unexercisable CEO 
options, and the value of exercisable CEO options.  
 
